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THE COMPLEXITY OF THE MIND: REJECTING MODULARITY ON THE BASIS OF 
COGNITIVE PENETRATION AND COGNITIVE PHENOMENOLOGY 
 
Historically, cognitive scientists and philosophers have accepted a theory of the mind 
known as modularity, whereby individual thought processes are completely separate and 
insulated from one another—meaning that cognitions have no influence on perceptions. 
However, the recent literature has seen a resurgence in support of a thesis of cognitive 
penetration, which suggests that cognitions can and do influence perceptions in a way that would 
be impossible if the mind were modular in the traditional sense. In addition to calling the idea of 
modularity into question, cognitive penetrability raises some passing concerns for the objectivity 
of scientific observation, and certain philosophical distinctions such as that between cognition 
and perception. Along similar lines, the literature has also seen an increase in the exploration of 
cognitive phenomenology, which similarly calls into question the distinction between cognition 
and perception and requires a model of the mind which is less clear-cut than the modular view. 
As such, it seems that given the evidence, one cannot accept either penetrability or cognitive 
phenomenology without accepting the other, given that they both rest on a similar view of the 
mind. In addition to calling into question the literal distinction between cognition and perception 
(though it may remain intact on a conceptual level), a subsection of cognitive phenomenology, 
known as evaluative phenomenology (the unique phenomenal character of emotions) similarly 
makes ambiguous the philosophical distinction between reason and emotion. Breaking this 
dichotomy, as well, makes the possible epistemic consequences of penetrability pale in 




comparison to those implied by cognitive phenomenology. While this is not an answer to the 
issues raised by penetrability, it does contextualize the difficulties in a way which opens the 
system up to a deeper understanding.  
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 In the 1980’s, the philosopher and cognitive scientist Jerry Fodor proposed a formal 
explanation of what at the time was considered in many ways to be the predominant view of how 
the mind processes information. This view he called his modularity view.1 Similar in many ways 
to what philosopher Susan Hurley would later call the “classical sandwich model” of the mind,2 
the modularity thesis states that individual thought processes are completely separate as well as 
insulated from each other. While this theory has largely fallen by the wayside, there are still 
those in philosophy and psychology alike who continue to hold to modified versions of 
modularity, in part because the insulation of different processes easily allows for the retaining of 
several important discriminations, most notably the classical clear line philosophers have cut 
between cognition and perception, as well as the distinction drawn between “reason” and 
“emotion.” In addition, as Fodor himself pointed out, modularity is important in order to retain 
the theory-neutrality of observation, without which scientific discovery becomes much more 
difficult, if not impossible, as without proper insulation from each other our cognitions may have 
the ability to “muddy” our perceptions. In other words, without “pure” and unadulterated 
reasoning capacities, scientific observation is not as objective as it needs to be in order to 
succeed.   
 One of the main motivations for Fodor’s release of his modularity view came from a shift 
in the tides of cognitive psychology, which had begun to discover empirical reasons to reject 
classical views like Fodor’s in favor of something more complex and, specifically, less insulated. 
                                                 
1 Fodor, The Modularity of Mind, (1983). 
2 Hurley, “Perception and Action: Alternative Views,” (2001). 




One such finding was the controversial theory of cognitive penetration, or the idea that higher-
order cognitive states such as beliefs and emotions can literally change the way that external 
objects are perceived. If this phenomenon could be shown to be true, it meant that there was no 
way that mind processes could be modular and insulated in the way that Fodor proposed, 
opening a whole can of worms for the way that thinkers viewed the mind, cognition, reasoning, 
and—a specific worry of Fodor’s—scientific observation. This also created problems for the 
distinctions of cognition and perception, as mentioned above, which is one of the reasons that the 
debate about cognitive penetration and its potential consequences continues to the present and 
has seen a notable resurgence in the recent literature.  
 More recently, philosophers of mind have begun to reconsider the idea of cognitive 
phenomenology, or the theory that cognitive states have unique and irreducible phenomenal 
qualities. This theory has similar consequences for modularity and other classical models of the 
mind, as it, too, seems to suggest that cognition and perception are more closely intertwined with 
one another than previously thought, in addition to proposing similar connections between other 
traditionally held philosophical dichotomies. One notable case of these interlacing connections 
comes from the idea of evaluative phenomenology as proposed by philosopher Michelle 
Montague, which suggests that emotional states have a phenomenology all their own—different 
from and irreducible to either sensory or other cognitive phenomenological experiences.3 The 
basis of this idea is that this emotional phenomenology is akin to perceptual phenomenology; 
yet, emotions still remain similar to the category of “cognitive” in a relevant way, meaning that 
these states in some ways straddle nicely the line commonly drawn between cognition and 
                                                 
3 Montague, The Given, (2016). 




perception, neatly bringing the distinctness of that line into question (at least on a deeper, non-
conceptual level). 
 Both the thesis of cognitive penetration and that of cognitive phenomenology call into 
question views of the mind which rest on some version of modularity and/or insulation of mental 
processes. However, it is evident that the separation(s) that these views support are less clear and 
distinct than theorists supporting more classical models of the mind want to believe. As such, it 
is evident that both cognitive penetration and cognitive phenomenology must rely on a view of 
the mind which is significantly more complex than the classical view(s). Specifically, while 
modularity-type views rest on this idea that mentation is a purely feedforward system (perception 
leads to cognitive processing leads to action, and each of these individual processes are fully 
completed before the mind moves on to the next), cognitive penetration and cognitive 
phenomenology suggest that there are also feedback routes operating within the mind (perhaps a 
cognition leads to a perception of something which is different from the actual object externally 
present [cognitive penetration], and that perception feeds forward to further cognition, and then, 
finally, to action). A view which involves such feedforward/feedback processes is required for 
both penetration and cognitive phenomenology to get off the ground, therefore, given the 
evidence for both of these theses, it is clear that a more “loopy” and complex view of the mind is 
necessary, and we ought to ditch more simplistic modularity-type theories in the face of this 
evidence. 
  Further, when we accept a feedforward/feedback view of the mind, we must necessarily 
adjust some of our classical philosophical distinctions. Two such distinctions which are 
important for the present project are the distinctions between cognition and perception, as well as 
(more peripherally) the line between reason and emotion. By doing away with these distinctions 




at the most concrete level of reality (though they can [and likely do] remain intact at the 
conceptual level), not only are we with left with a more complex view of the mind, but we are 
also faced with the problem of how that mind can or does go about processing external 
information for the sake of knowledge acquisition. Cognitive penetration in particular seems to 
create problems for epistemic theories, as it means that we have one more reason not to trust our 
senses, and to be suspect of our cognitive motivations for believing the things we do about our 
outside world. As will be discussed in Chapter One, this comes with varying degrees of concern 
about the overall epistemic implications of penetrability—followed up in Chapter Three by an 
argument that the “new” complexity of the mind makes these epistemic concerns rather pale in 
comparison to the other concerns raised by phenomena related to cognitive phenomenology and 
cognitive penetration taken in tandem. 
In summary, the current project will seek to demonstrate the following. First, that there is 
a solid amount of empirical and philosophical evidence to suggest that cognitive penetration is a 
plausibly existent phenomenon and ought to be accepted as such (Chapter One). Second, there is 
a similar amount of philosophical theorizing to reasonably suggest that cognitive 
phenomenology is an acceptable theory (Chapter Two). Third, both of these ideas rest on a 
wholly more complex model of the mind which rejects modularity and related insular theories. 
As such, neither penetrability nor cognitive phenomenology can be rejected without having to do 
some heavy philosophical work and a good deal of bullet biting in order to simultaneously accept 
the other, meaning that one must either reject both cognitive penetration and cognitive 
phenomenology or accept them both. Based on the evidence, it seems to be the most logical and 
reasonable route is to accept them both, which also means one is accepting some version of a 
feedforward/feedback view of the mind. By accepting this view of the mind, one rejects the 




now-problematic distinctions between cognition/perception and reason/emotion, and one must 
subsequently rethink the way that one theorizes about knowledge acquisition, as not only are 
perceptual experiences epistemically questionable, but in the face of this new model and theories 
like evaluative phenomenology, so are cognitive experiences. In light of the complexity created 
by the similar mental basis of cognitive penetration and cognitive phenomenology, it seems that 
the epistemic problems created by cognitive penetration (i.e. giving us one more reason to 
distrust our perceptual experiences) are not so severe when one considers that not only are our 
sensory processes more complex than we initially believed, but so are our cognitions, emotions, 












 Due to advances in cognitive science and psychology, questions about the internal 
workings of perception have begun to receive answers which go beyond the subjective data 
collected by early studies of perception. As a result, questions about our ability to trust our own 
senses became reinvigorated in light of furthered understanding about these underlying 
processes, and in the 1980’s this issue of perceptual trust caused renewed concerns for a variety 
of fields, including philosophy and the sciences. The main concern which sparked this interest 
was the theory-neutrality of observation. If we cannot trust our own perceptions of the external 
world—if these perceptions can be influenced by underlying cognitive beliefs, desires, and 
affective states in a way that manipulates or even changes the phenomenal character of an 
experience—how is it possible to come to genuine scientific understanding? In other words, if it 
is possible that cognitions are altering perceptual modalities to the point of altering sensory 
experiences, it seems that observation is not theory-neutral in the way that was supposed to be a 
necessary precursor for unadulterated scientific discovery. This phenomenon of higher-order 
cognitive influence on perceptual systems within the brain has been termed “cognitive 
penetration,” and remains a debated topic because of its scientific, epistemic, and philosophy of 
mind implications.  
 Although some of the steam of the original debate regarding the theory-neutrality of 
scientific observation has calmed in recent years as we have begun to gain a more thorough 
understanding of human psychology (specifically the discovery of the inevitability of selective 
attention), whether cognitive penetration is an existent phenomenon continues to be somewhat 
contested in the philosophical literature. In part, this contention is a result of the implications 




cognitive penetration has for theoretical models of the mind—in light of cognitive penetration 
and related phenomenon, the human brain seems to be more complex than a simple 
input-processing-output system. 4  More narrow concerns brought to light by evidence of 
penetrability concern the epistemic issues associated with penetrability—whether these concerns 
are troublesome, neutral, or nonexistent. In the present work, the debate surrounding the 
existence of cognitive penetrability will be examined in an attempt to establish penetration as a 
plausibly existent phenomenon. Given the existence of cognitive penetrability, some of the 
potential philosophical consequences of this phenomenon will be discussed. Specifically, issues 
related to doubting perceptual experiences, as well as the idea that penetrability blurs the 
boundaries between cognition and perception will be highlighted, but of key importance to the 
present project will be the argument that if penetration exists as it seems to, then a more complex 
view of the mind is required. 
Part I: Cognitive Penetrability 
Defining Penetration 
 Cognitive penetration is one explanation for potential phenomenological differences 
between two subjects who are perceiving the same stimuli. As the philosopher Susan Siegel 
defines it in her influential 2012 paper, cognitive penetration is the possibility that “for two 
subjects (or for one subject in different counterfactual circumstances, or at different times) to 
have visual experiences with different contents while seeing and attending to the same distal 
stimuli under the same external conditions, as a result of differences in other cognitive (including 
affective) states.”5 In other words, cognitively penetrated experiences are those instances where 
                                                 
4 Hurley, “Perception and Action,” (2001). 
5 Siegel, “Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification,” (2012), pgs. 205-6. 




cognitions—generally delineated in the literature as including such capacities as beliefs, 
knowledge, desires, traits, and/or emotions—influence to the point of altering an agent’s 
phenomenal experience of a fixed external stimulus. For example, two persons could be 
experiencing the same external visual scene of a professor writing on a chalkboard. Jack believes 
that this professor always writes with white chalk, as has seemed to be the case all semester. 
However, Jill, having bumped into the professor before class knows that the professor has run 
out of white chalk and is using yellow today. This difference in cognitive states between Jack 
and Jill (beliefs and background knowledge) cause them to perceive the chalk on the board 
differently—as either white or yellow, respectively—despite both seeing and attending to the 
same stimulus.6 This difference is caused not by anything in the external world—both Jack and 
Jill have exactly the same perceptual stimuli to work with and attend to—but rather is solely a 
result of their difference in cognition. 
 Much of the face-value controversy surrounding the cognitive penetrability theory 
involves the difficulty in getting data both for its existence, and for its antithesis. Because so 
much of the brain and its processes remains a black box, with its trillions of connections and 
interactions, it is difficult to discern one way or another whether cognitive penetration exists, yet 
the implications for both theses have intriguing and important theoretical applications.   
What Counts as a “Cognition”? 
 One of the more difficult issues involved in defining and delineating even the potential 
for the cognitive penetration of perceptual experiences comes in the form of getting clear on a 
definition of “cognition.” What states and mental processes are allowed to count as one of these 
higher-order phenomena is particularly tricky business with steep implications for how the rest 
                                                 
6 My sincere thanks to my colleague, Joshua Jarrott, for presenting me with the basis for this example. In addition to 
obtaining an advanced degree in philosophy, Master Jarrott practices legitimate sorcery in his spare time. 




of our definitions and arguments play out. There are a high number of competing definitions of 
“cognition” in the literature; definitions which are also partially dependent on whether or not the 
author is a philosopher, a psychologist, or from some other background training, as the practical 
and theoretical implications vary somewhat by field. In philosophy, a “cognition” is commonly 
defined as a “propositional attitude,” a la Bertrand Russell. In other words, a mental state is 
cognitive if it is one which is expressed towards a propositional content. For example, the belief 
expressed in the statement “I believe that the ocean is deep” is an attitude (of belief) directed at 
the proposition, “the ocean is deep,” making it a propositional attitude, and therefore a cognition. 
As noted above, common categories of such propositional attitudes in the cognitive penetration 
literature include beliefs, knowledge, desires, traits, and emotions.  
 One issue of particular importance to the present discussion is the controversy 
surrounding whether or not affective states are cognitive in the relevant sense. While many 
philosophers who follow the propositional attitude definition of “cognition” see no problem with 
including emotions among human cognitive states, psychologists—who are doing much of the 
writing and almost all of the research in the cognitive penetration debate—do not consider 
emotions to be cognitive in the way that knowledge, beliefs, or desires are considered to be.7 
Psychologists do not tend to operationalize emotions in the same way they do knowledge or 
beliefs, and as such, very little of the current penetration work involves penetrations by 
emotions, though many proponents of a penetrability thesis argue that this is a clear case of 
penetrability, and one which is worth considering as part of the greater discussion.8 Both the 
disagreement as to the categorical status of emotions, as well as the lack of evidence, puts 
                                                 
7 This, of course, is a bit of an over-generalization, but is indicative of the general trends which exist within the 
given disciplines.  
8 See, for example, Siegel, “Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification,” (2012). 




penetration by emotion in a fairly precarious place, since even if it was shown to be an existent 
phenomenon, it would remain tenuous whether or not this phenomenon was relevantly related to 
cognitive penetration or not. 
Part II: Potential Consequences of Penetrability 
The Need for Encapsulated Perceptual Modules  
 The idea of penetrability has historically been seen as particularly detrimental to 
scientific discovery, as it results in theories that are no longer based solely “on the facts,” but 
may in fact be “polluted” by the pre-existing beliefs/ideas of the observer. Although it is well 
accepted that a theorist’s own beliefs and understanding may influence how she interprets the 
information she is receiving through her sensory modalities, it is understandably more 
problematic to propose that these beliefs may be manipulating the nature of the perception itself. 
Siegel gives an example of how penetrability might influence scientific observation in this way, 
suggesting that a person who believes in a theory of preformationism (the idea that organisms 
develop from miniature, fully-formed versions of themselves) may have a cognitively penetrated 
experience when observing sperm cells, causing the scientist to literally see embryos which are 
not there in reality because of the strength of her belief that an embryo ought to be there.9 As 
such, it is not a matter of misinterpretation of the data as is so often discussed in scientific 
inquiry, or even a natural bias based on selective attention or other non-cognitive factors, but a 
relative “trick of the mind” which does not seem to be able to be meaningfully neutralized for the 
purpose of authentic scientific investigation.  
In order to protect the purity of scientific investigation, the highly influential thinker Jerry 
Fodor proposed as the only solution to the penetrability problem sensory systems which are 
                                                 
9 Siegel, “Cognitive Penetrability and Perceptual Justification,” (2012), pg. 211. 




“informationally encapsulated” and therefore impenetrable by higher-order cognitive influences 
(as well as cross-modal penetrability by other sensory systems).10 Although our understanding of 
cognitive science has continued to call this theory of encapsulated modules into question, 
supporters of Fodor’s original theory remain,11  though the specific nature of the theory has 
changed some since the 1980’s. Overall, however, opponents of the penetrability thesis remain 
tied in some way to the basic tenet of Fodor’s theory—that the sensory systems are impenetrable, 
at least on some level, to cognitive influence, subsequently insulating these systems from undue 
higher-order influence. In general, opponents of penetrability—hereafter referred to as 
encapsulation theorists12—have modified the original modularity idea to adjust for emerging 
research, supposing that it is not perceptual systems as a whole which are impenetrable, as Fodor 
originally proposed, but instead it is merely the “early” stages of these systems which remain 
impenetrable to outside influence beyond what they are designed to process (i.e. perceptual 
inputs from the outside world). As such, the strongest theory which prevents cognitive 
penetration currently rests on the idea that perceptual systems, specifically visual systems, are 
impenetrable to higher-order cognitions in the very early stages after sensory input (~60-80 
                                                 
10 Fodor, Modularity of Mind, (1983). 
11  Raftopoulos, Cognition and Perception, (2009); Pylshyn, “Is Vision Continuous with Cognition?,” (1999); 
Rollins, “The Mind in Pictures,” in Cognitive Penetrability of Perception, ed. Raftopoulos, (2005); Campbell, 
“Molyneux’s Question and Cognitive Impenetrability,” in Cognitive Penetrability of Perception, ed. Raftopoulos, 
(2005); Müller, “There Must be Encapsulated Nonconceptual Content in Vision,” in Cognitive Penetrability of 
Perception, ed. Raftopoulos, (2005). 
12 It is important to note that not all theorists who are opposed to a cognitive penetrability thesis buy into a Fodorian 
method for its rebuttal (i.e. sensory systems as modular), particularly in light of the emerging research. However, in 
general the best way to counter a thesis of penetration is to argue its antithesis, which could be called cognitive 
impenetrability, but—for the sake of clarity—will be referred to throughout the current work as encapsulation.   




milliseconds after stimulus presentation),13 meaning that, at the very least, basic ideas such as 
color and shape remain unmuddied by cognitive influence.14  
 A further important modification on the original modularity thesis is an abandonment of 
the idea that sensory modalities do not penetrate each other. Fodor’s original encapsulation 
model suggested that not only were sensory systems insulated from higher-order cognitive 
influence, but these modalities were similarly insulated from other first-order systems. As such, 
sounds could not penetrate visual stimuli, etc. However, some modern encapsulation theorists do 
concede that, due to a difference in processing times, it seems possible that sensory modalities do 
penetrate each other in some way(s). That being said, encapsulation theorists do not see this kind 
of penetration as particularly problematic in the way that penetrations from higher-order 
cognitive systems are, either because it is deemed to take place outside of the impenetrable space 
of the sensory systems, or because it is simply deemed to be unproblematic. Therefore, 
something like the McGurk effect—a phenomenon whereby seeing certain visual stimuli 
changes how an auditory stimulus is perceived—is interesting for a variety of reasons, but 
relatively unimportant for the cognitive penetration debate, insofar as encapsulation theorists 
accept it as compatible with their position.   
 While theory neutrality in scientific observation has been a key focus for opponents of 
cognitive penetrability, there are also practical concerns associated with the phenomenon which 
go beyond scientific discovery and seem to give more weight to the argued necessity of 
encapsulated perceptual systems. For example, the psychologist Athanassios Raftopoulos 
                                                 
13 Though there is some evidence of cognitive activity taking place prior to 60 ms after a stimulus presentation, 
indicating that if there is encapsulated visual processing, it is less than 10-20 ms in length—arguably not enough 
time to prevent penetrability as such (see Cecchi, "Cognitive Penetration, Perceptual Learning and Neural 
Plasticity," [2014]). 
14 Lupyan, “Cognitive Penetrability of Perception in the Age of Prediction: Predictive Systems are Penetrable 
Systems,” (2015); Cecchi, "Cognitive Penetration, Perceptual Learning and Neural Plasticity," (2014). 




suggests that penetrable sensory systems entail the death of realism, specifically scientific 
realism, but more controversially, he argues that perhaps all other forms of realism come into 
question as well. 15  In other words, what Raftopoulos is proposing is that either we make 
plausible a Fodorian idea of encapsulation, or nearly all of our theories and observations about 
the external world quite broadly fall into a kind of subjective skepticism at best, or, at worst, 
absolute relativism.  
Although Raftopoulos ideas are somewhat extreme, other thinkers have made similarly 
concerning claims, though not quite so totally damming to perceptual reality. For example, it has 
been suggested by the philosopher Chris Tucker 16  that it is not just dogmatic theories of 
epistemology which have potential issues if a theory of penetrability maintains, but, by-and-
large, most epistemic theories have some threats to face in light of such cognitive influences, 
implying that our very ability to know and understand the world around us, both formally 
through scientific study and practically in everyday interactions, is called into question by 
cognitive penetrability.  
In summary, encapsulation theorists are concerned with cognitive penetration for three 
main reasons. First, and most historically relevant, is the idea that cognitive penetration threatens 
the theory-neutrality of scientific observation. Without theory-neutrality, it is argued, we add yet 
another confounding factor to scientific inquiry, threatening its objective nature. Second, it has 
been argued that not only does scientific inquiry come into question in light of cognitive 
penetrability, so do more general theories of realism, defined as a one-to-one correspondence 
between what is being perceived and that object’s existence in the external world. Relatedly, 
                                                 
15 Raftopoulos, “Defending Realism on the Proper Grounds,” (2006). 
16 Tucker, “If Dogmatists Have a Problem with Penetrability, You Do Too,” (2014). 




theories of epistemology which include any role for sensory justification of beliefs ought to be 
concerned with the idea of cognitive penetrability, as well. These concerns provide motivation 
for encapsulation theorists to defend their position in light of both empirical and theoretical 
pushback from proponents of penetrability.  
Defending Encapsulation: Explaining Away Supposed Cases of Penetration 
Attention. The main work of encapsulation theorists is to successfully argue that the 
empirical evidence which seems to suggest cognitive penetration is better explained through 
other means. Specifically, it is frequently argued that empirical data is better explained by an 
attentional shift in the observer, rather than via a cognitive explanation. This counterargument 
has led to a shift in the definition of penetration to include attentional factors, yet the argument 
persists as a positive alternate explanation for situations generally taken to be evidence of 
penetration. A notable case of the attentional strategy occurred at the beginning of the debate in 
the 1980’s, when Paul Churchland suggested that Gestalt images like the duck/rabbit are a matter 
of penetration—perhaps, he argued, a duck hunter is more likely to see a duck, and a gardener a 
rabbit, based on their background knowledge of and experiences with these animals penetrating 
their initial perception of the figure.17 However, as was pointed out by Fodor in response, it is not 
background beliefs, but rather where an observer focuses his attention which causes the shift in 
such Gestalt images to occur.18 Attention, argue encapsulation theorists, is by definition a shift in 
the perceptual processing being done by the agent. This shift is how one accounts for the 
differences between subjects’ experiences, rather than by making an appeal to cognitive 
penetration.  
                                                 
17 Churchland, “Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality: A Reply to Jerry Fodor,” (1988). 
18 Fodor, “A Reply to Churchland’s ‘Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality’,” (1988). 




A similar argument is made regarding expertise and penetrability. Susanna Siegel argued 
in a 2006 work that the phenomenal difference(s) between seeing a particular kind of tree (oak, 
pine, etc.) before learning to identify it and seeing it after the relevant learning has taken place 
was a matter of that acquired knowledge penetrating the perceptual experience of seeing the 
tree.19 In short, the argument is that expertise is a specific kind of background knowledge which 
penetrates perceptual experience. However, as was pointed out by encapsulation theorists, and 
later conceded by many of penetrability’s defenders, it seems that expertise is merely allowing 
the subject to know where and how to direct her attention in order to correctly identify the 
object(s) in question. In other words, once it is learned how to recognize an oak tree, an agent 
will know to direct her attention to the leaves, noting their distinct shape, and, with practice, this 
attentional shift will become automatic and imperceptible to the agent, allowing her to take in the 
relevant details and subsequently make a correct identification of the tree being perceived 
without noticing where her attention has been pulled to in order to acquire the relevant 
information.  
While it does seem to be the case that attentional shifts act as a reasonable explanation for 
many of the classic examples used to illustrate the cognitive penetration phenomenon, such as 
Siegel’s tree identification example above, some thinkers have suggested that attentional 
strategies are only affective in refuting penetrability given the nature of the attentional shift. For 
example, Fiona Macpherson 20  argues that it is obvious that spatial attentional shifts are a 
reasonable argument against penetrability cases like tree identification. However, there are cases 
in which attentional shifts may actually be further evidence for penetrability, rather than 
                                                 
19 Siegel, “Which Properties are Represented in Perception?,” (2006). 
20  Macpherson, “Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect 
Mechanism,” (2012). 




evidence against the thesis. There are two things which one must show when proposing an 
attentional shift argument against a proposed case of penetrability. First, one must illustrate 
where the attentional shift takes place. Second, one must further show that this attentional shift is 
relevant without itself being cognitive in nature. According to Macpherson, certain cases such as 
those where colors are misperceived—theoretically based on underlying beliefs about what color 
the presented object characteristically is—do not involve an appropriately non-cognitive 
attentional shift. Rather, if it is a shift in attention (e.g. from the yellow aspect of an orange 
image to the red aspect), this shift seems to be just as cognitive as the belief that bananas are 
usually yellow, and as such is still a case of perceptual senses being penetrated by a cognition, 
rather than something more akin to a spatial shift in attention—a factor which would change the 
nature of the perception on a non-cognitive level.  
The philosopher Francesco Marchi 21  makes a more nuanced yet similar argument, 
suggesting that attentional shifts are themselves cases of cognitive penetration, rather than a non-
cognitive factor modifying perceptual experience. Marchi argues that attention is a kind of 
metacognitive control factor—therefore, attention is itself cognitive. Given that attention is a 
cognitive experience, any instance of penetration explained by attention must remain a case of 
cognitive penetration—it does not explain away the phenomenon, instead it shifts the cognition 
involved from being a belief/trait/emotion, to being attention.  
Judgment. A further explanation for the empirical evidence used to support cognitive 
penetration regards an argument similar to, yet distinct from the attention argument which 
suggests that it is simply the judgment of the observing agent which is changed, rather than the 
phenomenal character of the experience itself. For example, in the case of the trees mentioned 
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above, it is possible that it is not the experience of the tree itself that is influenced by the 
knowledge of what an oak tree looks like, nor is it necessarily the attentional focus of the agent 
which is causing a “difference” in experience between knowing and not knowing how to identify 
the tree. Instead, it is the judgment the agent makes when she says to herself “that is an oak tree” 
which is influenced by the belief that the tree is an oak tree. In other words, the difference 
between knowing it is an oak tree and not knowing lies in the higher-order judgment, a change at 
the level of further cognitive processes, rather than a change in the first-order sensory 
phenomenal experience. As such, this is a case of a cognition (belief) altering cognition 
(judgment), therefore subjects are reporting a change in judgment, rather than a change in 
perception. For now, however, all that is important to note is the possibility that it is the 
judgment of a perception causing what looks like penetration, rather than actual cognitive 
penetration. 
 Those in support of a cognitive penetrability thesis embrace a similar rebuttal to this 
judgment argument as is employed in refuting the attention argument as detailed above. 
Specifically, in experiments where subjects are given no time limit, it is clear they have some 
time to adjust their judgments to be in line with their perceptual experiences. Given the tree 
example again, this is the difference between judging a specific tree to be an oak from a moving 
car and judging it to be an oak while strolling leisurely through the forest. Proponents of 
penetrability argue that in such untimed circumstances, in order to make the judgment argument 
work, one must attribute to subjects a belief or judgment which is not in correspondence with the 
experience that is currently being had by the subject.22 In essence, one has to assume that one’s 
subjects are “systematically mistaken about what they are doing: they are not reporting what they 
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are seeing”23 in order for these subjects to make judgments and reports which are apparently so 
mismatched with reality—unless, of course, their experience is cognitively penetrated. 
Penetrated experiences would have the qualities which subjects are reporting their judgment(s) of 
these experiences to be, and therefore penetration appears to be the more parsimonious 
explanation of these untimed cases.  
Memory. A final argument to explain away the seeming evidence in favor of 
penetrability is that of memory. While it may appear that a situation or experience is the result of 
penetrability, in reality what is happening is that the observing agent is reinterpreting his memory 
of the experience, rather than the experience as it is happening. For example, although the 
sensory information was of a maple tree, it is remembered and interpreted by the subject as being 
of an oak tree, which is what is causing the mistake in “perception.” This sort of mistake based 
on memories of experiences means that what seems to be cognitive penetration may instead be a 
case of cognition penetrating memory (itself a cognition), rather than cognition penetrating 
perception. This explanation salvages perceptual abilities from higher-order influence while 
allowing for such cognitions to play some role in phenomenal experience.  
While this memory argument does in fact salvage some of the experimental data from 
being interpreted as cognitive penetrability, it is important to note that this particular explanation 
only works in cases where the stimulus is removed before a judgment is made or experience 
reported. Modularity theorists are indeed correct that if it is only after a stimulus is removed in 
these penetrability experiments that interpretations are made, likely the subjects are making 
judgments or reporting experiences of memories instead of perceptual events, and as such this 
cannot count as genuine penetration since it is after-the-fact as opposed to being in the moment 
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of perception. For example, Balcetis and Dunning conducted studies in which ambiguous stimuli 
with two possible animal shapes were presented on a computer screen, and then after their 
removal subjects were asked to report the animal they had seen, with a prize offered for more 
reports of certain classes of animals (e.g. farm animals).24 While the original interpretation of 
these results suggested that the desire for the prize and therefore a desire to see certain types of 
animals was penetrating the perceptual experience of the stimuli, it is likely the memory of the 
stimulus that was being altered based on desire rather than the perceptual experience itself, since 
the stimulus was removed before the judgment was made. As such, this is likely not a case of 
cognitive penetration. Yet not all experimental evidence for penetration has involved the removal 
of the stimulus before a judgment or report was made by the subjects, and this memory argument 
is not relevant for these cases, so while some of the empirical studies used as backup for a 
cognitive penetrability thesis seem to be negligible in light of a memory interpretation, any 
instance where the stimulus remains in place for continued inspection by a subject retains its 
viability as evidence for penetrability.  
Illusion persistence.  Particularly in the early days of the cognitive penetration debate, 
though still seen occasionally in the current literature, are examples of visual illusions as 
potential evidence for perceptual penetration. Illusions are cases of perception gone awry, and as 
such, provide important clues into the underlying brain processes associated with visual 
perception. Necker cubes, Müller-Lyer lines, and certain Gestalt shift images are all common 
examples within the penetration literature. However, as Fodor and others have pointed out, 
illusions are potentially a good argument for the impenetrability of experience. Specifically, 
Fodor and Pylshyn argued that if visual perception could be cognitively penetrated, then an 
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illusion unexplainable by attention such as the Müller-Lyer lines would cease to persist as an 
illusory experience after one learned that the lines are, in reality, the same length, because the 
acquired belief ought to penetrate the perceptual experience, effectively altering it so that the 
illusion no longer exists for the individual. Yet, the lines continue to appear as different lengths, 
no matter how much one attempts to overcome the misperception.25 For Fodor, this provides 
solid evidence for his theory of encapsulation. 
Figure 1.1 
Müller-Lyer Line Illusion  
The empirical evidence, however, suggests that this lack of change in illusions via 
changes in belief/learning may, in fact, be evidence of penetrability rather than clear evidence of 
encapsulation. Lupyan has suggested that the lack of learning in certain visual illusions such as 
the Müller-Lyer lines is the direct result of more strongly-embedded knowledge about the state 
of the world. 26  In this specific case, research shows that when corners are oriented in the 
everyday lives of persons who live in constructed environments in the same way as the line 
which appears to be the longer line in the Müller-Lyer illusion, it is, in reality, longer than 
straight edges which have corners oriented in the same manner as the shorter-appearing Müller-
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Lyer line.27 As such, it is this more-ingrained, evolutionarily advantageous knowledge which is 
continuing to penetrate perceptions of the Müller-Lyer lines, rather than the knowledge that in 
this one specific case the lines are actually the same length. According to Lupyan, it makes sense 
that the knowledge with real-world application (i.e. that in general, corners which appear in X 
manner are longer/shorter) would continue to penetrate our perceptions in the way they do in the 
Müller-Lyer case because it is a piece of knowledge which is more applicable and generalizable 
than the knowledge that these particular lines happen to be the same length. In other words, it 
just is not worth the cognitive effort it would take our brains to override this particular 
penetration with more obscure knowledge when we have been using the generalized knowledge 
to navigate the world for much longer, and this generalized knowledge is more widely 
applicable. 
Part III: Defending Cognitive Penetration 
Empirical Support for Penetrability 
 Attempts have been made to provide empirical support for cognitive penetration, with 
understandably mixed results. One of the major difficulties in this and similar kinds of research 
is the relatively impossible nature of accurately gathering and measuring the subjective 
phenomenal experiences of individual agents. Many of the initial studies conducted which 
suggested the existence of cognitive penetrability were conducted by “New Look” psychologists 
in the 1940’s and 50’s. New Look psychology was a branch of the emerging field of cognitive 
psychology which suggested that, rather than simply observing subjects and their reactions to 
stimuli, it may be useful to consider the internal processing and functioning of those reactions.28 
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In other words, psychologists began to ask for the first time what the underlying structures of 
thought were like. These early studies included experiments showing slowed reaction times to 
identify mismatched colors and suits on playing cards (e.g. red spades and black hearts), and 
studies regarding Gestalt images such as the faces/vase or duck/rabbit. Although many of these 
studies have been deemed as interesting but not, ultimately, evidence for penetrability, a number 
of the initial investigations still provide grounding both for the penetrability debate, as well as a 
basis for research designs for the continued study of penetrability.  
Penetration by Desire 
A specific variety of cognitive penetration which seems to be particularly prominent 
given the truth of the penetrability thesis yet is understudied and particularly difficult to study 
empirically is orectic penetration. Orectic penetrations are those perceptual experiences which 
are altered by an agent’s desires. The classic New Look study which is often cited as evidence 
for this particular variety of penetration is an early study conducted by Bruner and Goodman,29 
who gave groups of “poor” and “rich” children either a number of coins or similarly sized 
cardboard disks and asked them to adjust a spot of light to the same size as the coin or disk they 
were holding. By and large, poor children made the light patch too big for coins compared to rich 
children, and rich and poor alike were much more likely to adjust the light appropriately for 
cardboard disks. Researchers originally interpreted these results to be suggesting that it was the 
desire for money by the poor children which caused this increase in size estimate. In addition, 
this particular experimental design helps account for many of the objections raised by modularity 
theorists—it cannot be a memory or a judgment of the children which is affecting their ability to 
adjust the light appropriately, since they continued to hold the coin in their hand for reference, 
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and attentional objections seem similarly useless in light of this particular design.30 However, 
researchers have been unable to replicate the results of this early study, and it faces further 
criticism in that no one considered that it may have been the monetary value of the coin which 
was causing the mismatch in the children’s ability to adjust the light appropriately.31 In other 
words, it has been suggested that the magnitude of the value of the coin being held (e.g. $0.10 vs. 
$0.01) may account for the larger adjustment in the light.32 This is particularly likely since it 
seems that the actual difference between rich and poor children was not especially steep, as was 
suggested by the original study’s authors. 
 Despite the criticism faced by the New Look studies on desire, other studies of 
penetration by desire seem to add to the potential strengths of the original Bruner and Goodman 
work. In 2006, Balcetis and Dunning saw a steep correlation between number of hours fasted and 
number of ambiguous pictures interpreted as being food-related, suggesting that desire for food 
was causing a perceptual shift for subjects, though this particular study has been criticized for the 
fact that hunger, a non-cognitive state, may be the real motivation for this perceptual shift, rather 
than a cognitive desire for food, and therefore the perceptual shift (if there is one) may not be 
indicative of cognitive penetrability.33 Similarly, in 2010, the same research team conducted 
several studies which suggest that a desire for money, water, etc., causes participants to judge 
more desired objects (e.g. a water bottle, a $100 bill) as being closer to them than they otherwise 
would, as is evidenced by distance judgments of more value-neutral objects.34 However, one 
must note that these 2010 studies are particularly easy targets of the argument that it is not the 
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desire influencing subjects’ perceptual experiences, but rather the desire affecting the judgment 
of distance, meaning these are not true cases of penetration, as discussed in detail above.  
Penetration by Color Belief 
One of the most promising of the more recent empirical developments in the study of 
penetrability is a series of studies based on the initial work done by Delk and Fillenbaum35 on the 
penetrability of visual perception by beliefs about the color of certain well-recognized objects 
such as bananas and stop signs. In the original Delk and Fillenbaum, study, subjects were given 
paper cutouts of objects, all made with the same red-orange colored paper. Some of these objects 
were characteristically red objects, such as pairs of lips or an apple, and others, though controlled 
to be of similar curvature and size, held no associated link to the color red, such as squares and 
mushrooms. Subjects were then asked to adjust a background panel ranging from yellow to red 
until it matched the cutout placed on top of it, and researchers found that subjects made the 
background much redder for characteristically red objects like the apple, where they more 
closely adjusted the background to the true color for cutouts such as the mushroom or square. 
In more recent work in this area, subjects were asked to adjust color photos until they 
became greyscale.36 Some of these pictures were of characteristically colored objects, and some 
were control pictures which did not have a stereotypical color. While control objects were 
generally set to within a very close range of the correct greyscale adjustment, the objects with 
characteristic colors were overcompensated for, falling significantly outside of the adjustment 
goal. For example, subjects had a tendency to turn pictures of bananas much bluer/greener than 
other objects. In theory, this result is explained via cognitive penetration in that, subjects literally 
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see these greyscale banana pictures as being more yellow than they actually are solely because of 
their beliefs about the color of bananas. It is this misguided phenomenological experience which 
leads subjects to overcompensate when adjusting the picture, and, according to proponents of 
cognitive penetrability, this overcompensation is ill-explained by any other means.  
More ethically problematic are studies which suggest that similar phenomenological 
processes take place regarding race. Levin and Banaji 37  found that when shown greyscale 
pictures of faces which were either given characteristically black or white facial features, 
subjects were much more likely to choose significantly darker backgrounds as matching the 
shading of the “black” faces, and lighter backgrounds for “white,” despite the fact that all the 
pictures had the exact same luminosity. Even more shockingly, follow up studies show that these 
effects are only amplified by knowing about the phenomenon, and similarly persist even in 
mixed faces which are racially neutral but are labeled as “black” or “white” by the researcher via 
a caption, suggesting even more strongly that there is a perceptual difference based on belief 
about the persons pictured, rather than the measured effects being the result of some kind of 
systematic misjudgment by the subjects.38  
Issues in Rebutting Color Penetrability 
It has been proposed that cases of color perception are much harder to explain away via 
encapsulation than many other proposed cases of penetrability without causing serious issues for 
other cognitive processes, such as systems of judgment.39 In altering these other systems in order 
to prevent penetrability, encapsulation theorists seem to be doing themselves a disservice by 
making the situation more epistemically, systemically, and theoretically problematic than would 
                                                 
37 Levin and Banaji, “Distortions in the Perceived Lightness of Faces: The Role of Race Categories,” (2006). 
38 Macpherson, “Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience,” (2012). 
39 Ibid. 




be the case if penetrability was just accepted. For example, Macpherson argues that in order to 
appropriately explain away the results of the initial color studies involving the changing 
background detailed above, one need necessarily assume that subjects are systematically 
confused about their own experiences, and their reports are in direct contradiction to their actual 
phenomenological experience.40 As suggested in the rebuttal to the attention argument described 
above, one must assume that subjects are systematically misreporting, misjudging, and mistaking 
their own experiences for something which is further from reality than what they are actually 
perceiving. In other words, when a subject says that she is seeing red, she is ignoring the actual 
sensory information in front of her (that of orange) in favor of (for some unexplained reason) the 
interpretation that the orange color is much redder than it is in reality. This apparent 
complication of what is happening for subjects makes penetrability the more parsimonious 
explanation of these color shifting experiments.    
Summary 
 Given the evidence both for and against cognitive penetrability, it seems that all things 
considered, accepting penetrability despite its potential problematic epistemological implications 
and ramifications for theories of realism is the more empirically and parsimoniously sound 
theoretical decision. While encapsulation theorists have made sound attempts at reinterpreting 
the available evidence for penetration, particularly given examples such as penetration by color 
beliefs, which cannot be explained away without attributing systematic errors to individual 
subjects and other theories of cognitive functioning, it seems that at least for now, proponents of 
penetrability have the upper hand in the debate.   
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Part IV: How Problematic is Penetrability? 
Implications for Models of the Mind 
After an initial review of the present data and thinking regarding the phenomenon, it 
seems curious in some ways that the debate surrounding whether or not cognitive penetration is 
an existent phenomenon or not is still (in some sense) a live discussion. What, exactly, is the 
thinking behind holding onto versions of classic modularity with such a death grip? At its center, 
penetration continues to be debated because of its potential implications for theories of how the 
mind operates. Thinkers who hold to modularity on some level—Fodor, Pylshyn, and 
Raftopoulos, among others—are also either wholesale or partially committed to a model of the 
mind which is much more straightforward and computer-like than cognitive penetrability allows. 
Often referred to as the “sandwich model” of cognition,41 these thinkers are committed to the 
idea that brains are merely interpretation hubs which intake data from the senses—such as 
sight—process it somewhere internally (completely separate from the influence of “higher-
order” processes [cognitions]), perhaps it is integrated in later processing with other sensory 
inputs to form a complete picture, and then commands are spit out by the brain to create actions 
to surround with that perceived reality. Much in the way that the computer responds to a 
keystroke—it receives an “&” input from keyboard, processes input, spits out an “&” 
command—so this model suggests the brain operates. The brain, in other words, is simple and 
linear in nature—input, process, response, repeat. Of particular significance is the idea that such 
a model necessarily involves a one-way flow of information; in other words, it is a 
feedforward-only system, disallowing for any (substantial) feedback from higher processes. 
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Cognitive penetration creates problems for this comparably simplistic model of the mind, 
because it suggests that the input received by the brain is not pure and unadulterated data in the 
way that a keystroke of an “&” will always be an “&.” Continuing the analogy, cognitive 
penetration suggests that the software of the mind—thoughts and ideas; cognitions—can alter 
how input is perceived. It is possible that based on the fact that we believe that “x,” an “&” input 
would result in both processing it and interacting with it as if it were a “#” or even an “*.” 
According to cognitive penetration, & does not always equal &, and this is a problem for the 
sandwich model of the mind. To suggest that cognitions may alter perceptions is to deny the one-
way information flow of modular and classical sandwich views of the mind. It is, in short, to 
suggest a much more complex and messier model of how the brain works which has important 
implications for theories of epistemology, for how we can and should conduct cognitive 
research, interpret psychological data, and it brings up questions of the relevance or applicability 
of all the work which has been done using this classic, simplistic model of the brain.  Of 
particular importance for the current project, such complex theories of the mind also open the 
door for other debated phenomena to be plausible—specifically the idea of cognitive 
phenomenology which will be discussed in Chapter Two. 
Retaining Dichotomies 
Despite the arguments discussed above, it seems plausible that the seemingly-devastating 
implications of the potential for penetrability suggested by its opponents is perhaps too dramatic 
at best, and ill-informed at worst. Over three centuries ago, Descartes mentioned in his 
Meditations, unsurprising to most people, that our sensory perceptions are, at times, 
questionable.42 It seems in some respects that those who oppose the idea of cognitive penetration 
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are suggesting that if our perceptual abilities are not only sometimes incorrect, but also 
penetrable to cognitive ideals, then we lose all ability to trust our senses for any justificatory 
information for belief. This, however, feels as though we have gotten halfway through the 
Meditations, failing to reach the point where Descartes reincorporates his sensory perceptions 
back into consideration (with a healthy skepticism of those times when our senses do fail us, 
such as when there is fog or we are tired or intoxicated). In some sense, then, encapsulation 
theorists are taking the idea of penetrability too far in order to benefit their own thesis—if one 
has to reject trust in one’s own senses in order to accept cognitive penetrability, it is obviously in 
everyone’s best interest to figure out how best to retain sensory encapsulation. Yet it does not 
appear that the actual consequences of penetrability would be all that damning. First, if 
penetrability is an existent phenomenon, it is something we have lived with for the entirety of 
modern human evolution, and it does not seem to have significantly impeded our progress, either 
individually or as a species more broadly. Further, it seems likely that being realistic about the 
potential consequences of penetrability will better enable us to discover ways to work around 
whatever issues it may in fact cause. In addition, even if we discover at some point that cognitive 
penetration is not something that happens, if we have attempted to “work around” penetrability, 
it seems our theories of ontology and epistemology will only be stronger for having compensated 
for those particular likely missteps—even if those missteps turn out to be due to something else 
entirely. 
Overall, then, it seems the main (and perhaps only) reason to reject penetrability is to 
retain a simpler version of the mind. If the workings of the human mind are more complex than 
modularity allows for, then not only is penetrability plausible, but many of the sharp divisions 
our philosophical and empirical theories and ideas have historically rested on will be dissolved; 




notably in the case of allowing for penetration is the blurring of the sharp distinction which has 
been previously drawn between cognition and perception. When cognitive penetration suggests 
that cognitions might have an influence on perceptual experiences, it is no longer clear where our 
sensory experiences end and our cognitions begin, yet this distinction between what is 
“cognitive” and what is “perceptive” is what much of the historical work within the philosophy 
of mind rests upon. Without a clear delineation between these categories, they are no longer 
nicely separate and easily manageable as unique phenomena, meaning that anything based on 
this distinction (as well as the terms of the distinction itself) must be rethought. It is, then, much 
easier to argue for a theory like modularity rather than abandon this useful dichotomy, as the 
abandoning of this particular distinction may very well (and, as will be suggested later, likely 
does) lead to having to abandon other related philosophical dichotomies.  
Part V: Summary and Conclusion 
 While not all of the empirical data in favor of a thesis of penetrability is exceptionally 
strong—in particular those experiments conducted at the beginning of the New Look 
movement—it is clear that, taken together with what we know about its implications and the lack 
of arguments against it which stand up to theoretical criticism, accepting the phenomenon of 
cognitive penetration and all of its implications is a reasonable place to land. Some of the 
implications of cognitive penetrability do, of course, require the modification or acceptance of 
less than ideal consequences, such as the abandonment of the sharp distinction between 
perception and cognition, but overall allowing for penetrability and its necessarily complex 
model of the mind seems to align more closely with reality than anything that must be abandoned 
to accept it (e.g. modular views of the mind). In the following chapter, we will turn to a 
secondary thesis—that of cognitive phenomenology—as further support for the idea that 




complex models of the mind and the subsequent erasure of some of philosophy’s sharper 
dichotomous distinctions have a greater bearing on reality than do the alternatives.  








A second issue (in addition to cognitive penetration) which has seen a resurgence in 
popularity in the philosophy of mind literature is that of cognitive phenomenology. While this 
thesis has roots in the work of the early phenomenologists like Husserl,43 after the study of 
phenomenology declined with the rise of behavioral and cognitive psychology, so did the idea 
that cognitions have a unique phenomenal character. This renewed interest in the topic of 
cognitive phenomenology shares some parallels with the resurgence of cognitive penetration—
namely, emerging evidence from the fields of neuroscience and psychology seem to give the idea 
of cognitive phenomenology a peg to hang its hat on. In short, the thesis of cognitive 
phenomenology is simply that cognitions—specifically conscious thoughts—have a unique 
phenomenal character which is irreducible to any sensory phenomenon (either alone or in some 
significant combination).44  For example, when I view a wood duck (and have the requisite 
knowledge about what sort of bird I am seeing), there is something it is like to deploy the 
concept of “wood duck” that is wholly unique from what it is like for me to see the green of the 
duck’s feathers or the yellow of its bill, to smell the algae of the pond it is swimming in, or to 
hear its angry quack as I get too close. That “something” is the phenomenal content of the 
thought “wood duck.” 
While the debate surrounding cognitive phenomenology’s viability as a thesis continues 
in the literature (with an emphasis put on its implications for consciousness and the distinction 
between “cognition” and “perception”), with very few exceptions its potential relation to (or, 
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more specifically, its possible implications for) cognitive penetration has gone nearly untouched. 
Overall, the biggest possible connection seems to be that cognitive phenomenology, if not 
conceived of as robust enough, collapses into (or, more likely, is confused with) cognitive 
penetration.45 The goal of the present work, then, is threefold. First, the thesis of cognitive 
phenomenology will be briefly examined to look at the most common arguments for and against 
its existence, in an effort to demonstrate how this concept is supposed to work/manifest itself, 
and to set up a strong basis for the remainder of the chapter. Second, it will be argued that, given 
the thesis of cognitive phenomenology, it appears that it is unique from and irreducible to not 
only sensory phenomenology, but also an idea of cognitive penetration. Between that work and 
the work completed in Chapter One, it will be suggested here that not only are the two theses 
separate from and irreducible to one another, but they share an important connection in that they 
have crucial implications for both what potential model(s) of the mind are viable, as well as how 
these models create potential problems for certain philosophical dichotomies—a thesis that will 
be expanded on in the following chapter.   
Part I: Establishing a Thesis of Cognitive Phenomenology 
Defining Cognitive Phenomenology 
 As noted above, cognitive phenomenology, in its strongest form, is defined as being a 
unique mode of phenomenal experience which is different from and irreducible to other 
phenomenologies. While there are those who argue for a variety of weaker forms of the idea (in 
particular, the sizable group of theorists who see cognitive phenomenology as being a variety of 
sensory phenomenology),46 these will go largely undiscussed in the present work for the sake of 
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time and simplicity. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the sole goal of the 
following section is to give a general overview of how this most robust version of cognitive 
phenomenology is supposed to work. The debate surrounding cognitive phenomenology, then, is 
not so much whether such an experience exists, but rather what implications its existence has (or 
does not have). In particular, cognitive phenomenology has important implications for how we 
discuss and theorize about consciousness, the nature of thoughts and cognitions, and, importantly 
for our present purposes, ideas about how the mind works.47 
Non-Iconic Thinking 
 Imagine that you are on the bus, headed to work, and suddenly remember that you have 
forgotten to feed your fish before leaving. This flash of remembering is what some thinkers have 
appealed to as being a cognitive phenomenological event. Other examples which fall under the 
argument of “non-iconic thinking”48—or thinking which does not involve sensory phenomenon, 
such as imaginative visualizations or emotions—include other metacognitive states such as 
tip-of-the-tongue experiences,49 feelings of knowing (e.g. “feeling” as though one knows the 
answer to a question), and “ah-ha” or “eureka” moments.50 The argument is a simple one: when 
one considers these non-iconic occurrences, it is very hard to explain the phenomenal 
experiences of them without an appeal to cognitive phenomenology. These experiences seem 
purely cognitive in nature, and as such cannot be “explained away” by suggesting that they are 
sensory in any way—it is clear that, because these experiences do not exist in any external space, 
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they must be completely contained within the mental processes of the experiencer, and this 
containment within mental space makes an appeal to sensory phenomena seem at first glance to 
be counterintuitive.  
While initially and intuitively appealing, these types of arguments for the existence of 
cognitive phenomenology do seem to be relatively weak on their own if one is not already on 
board with the idea that cognitions have unique phenomenal character, as it can easily be the 
case that what we are taking as a “phenomenon” here is merely a misinterpretation of sensory or 
emotional experiences—such as excitement (ah-ha moments), frustration (tip-of-the-tongue 
phenomenon), or a mental visualization (imagining your fish “in your mind’s eye” while 
remembering that you did not feed her). 51  It may also be that we are simply wishfully 
interpreting these experiences as uniquely phenomenological as a confabulated response to not 
fully understanding the origin of the “feeling” associated with them.52 In other words, while the 
phenomenal experience of a tip-of-the-tongue state is one of frustration or irritation at not being 
able to come up with the known word, one may interpret this sensation as being unique—either 
because one is already wedded to an idea of cognitive phenomenology, or because the idea that it 
may be irritation does not come to mind right away, and our actions and feelings demand 
explanation. Such a demand for explanation is seen in the social psychology literature, as pointed 
out by the philosopher Peter Carruthers, where people see their behaviors and post hoc find an 
explanation for them. Thus, it is supposed, one might be misinterpreting one’s own phenomenal 
experiences because we know that a tip-of-the-tongue state has occurred, and we need a way to 
explain it—for some, supposing that, on self-reflection, the explanation for this occurrence is that 
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such a state has a phenomenal character which is unique from any other seems the most 
plausible, though this does not necessarily mean that it is a correct view. 
That being said, if one can establish that cognitive phenomenology is an existent 
phenomenon, then it is possible that one may reincorporate metacognitive states like feelings of 
knowing and ah-ha moments into what counts as a cognitive phenomenological sensation. 
However, it seems that non-iconic thinking alone is not the strongest way to establish the 
existence of a unique and irreducible phenomenology of cognition.  
Contrast Arguments 
 One of the most common attempts to illustrate the existence of cognitive phenomenology 
is by appealing to intuition and using an illustrative case of phenomenal contrast. One very 
salient example of this is the phenomenal contrast case proposed by the philosopher Galen 
Strawson, who proposes that there is a difference between hearing a sentence like “this is a 
duck” spoken in a language that one is fluent in, and hearing it spoken in a language one does not 
know, such as Spanish (“esto es un pato”).53 The argument here is that, if one seriously considers 
the event of hearing the sentence “esta es un pato” as occurring simultaneously to a monoglot 
Spanish speaker and a monoglot English speaker, there will be a phenomenal difference for the 
two subjects, despite the fact that the sensory experience of the sentence will be exactly the 
same—both speakers are hearing the exact same words and sounds coming from the same 
speaker. Therefore, what is being argued for here is that the phenomenal difference for these 
subjects is based on the phenomenal character of understanding and not understanding, 
respectively. This difference is phenomenal in character, but its base nature is cognitive. This is a 
conscious phenomenal experience as of understanding (or as of not understanding/being 
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confused), regardless of whether one is consciously thinking “I understand” (or “I do not 
understand”).  
 The most common form of attack against this type of argument is to claim competing 
intuitions about the case. Opponents of cognitive phenomenology propose that the only genuine 
difference between “this is a duck” and “esta es un pato” for an English monoglot is sensory. 
There is an auditory difference between the two sentences, if one is looking at the speaker there 
is a difference in facial movements to make the differing sounds, but, the opponent concludes, 
there is no phenomenal difference beyond that, and to propose that there is one is to be begging 
the cognitive phenomenology question.  
In addition, similar arguments as those proposed against non-iconic thinking also apply 
here, though perhaps more weakly. For example, it may be argued that one is (or is not) visually 
imagining a duck, and therefore any phenomenal character involved in the experience is 
sensory—specifically visual. If one knows that “pato” means “duck”, one will picture a duck and 
have a visual sensory experience; if one does not have this requisite knowledge, one will imagine 
no duck-like image at all. This imagining, it is argued, is the only difference between 
“understanding” and “not understanding.” While this does appear to be a reasonable reply, it has 
been argued that such imagistic understandings of semantics are not always necessary—or even 
possible. This is illustrated by the use of ambiguous sentences such as “I hope the food is not too 
hot for you”54 or “the boy the man the girl saw chased fled.”55 To understand such sentences, it is 
argued, requires no imagistic understanding, but rather a purely cognitive understanding of the 
words involved (e.g. the double meaning of the word “hot”). Therefore, the argument from 
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mental images fails at least in these particular cases, offering support for the idea that such 
images are inapplicable in other cases as well.  
Zombies 
 The philosopher Terry Horgan proposed that perhaps the best way to argue for the 
existence of cognitive phenomenology is to posit the existence of a variety of “partial 
philosophical zombies” a la David Chalmers, to illustrate that an opponent of cognitive 
phenomenology must do some serious bullet biting to deny the existence of a unique and 
irreducible phenomenal character for cognitive experiences. 56  Chalmers’ original thought 
experiment was to propose that there may be “philosophical zombies” who are like us in every 
way, yet lack the conscious phenomenological experiences that we have, in theory showing that 
consciousness is made up of a separate mind and body, and therefore physicalism is 
implausible.57 Horgan proposes partial zombies who, unlike Chalmers’ zombies, have all of the 
conscious sensory phenomenal experiences that human persons have, but instead lack certain 
cognitive phenomenological aspects, such as a lack of speech understanding (having “learned the 
rules” of social linguistic exchanges in the style of John Searle’s Chinese Room 58), or an 
inability to see the “self-as-source” of actions. The argument, then, is not just that these zombies 
are robustly conceivable, but that this conceivability illustrates that we must have such cognitive 
phenomenological experiences, or it would not seem strange to us that these partial zombies lack 
such phenomena. The hope is that, through this illustration, we can successfully move past the 
competing intuitions issue that causes perpetual debate in the use of phenomenal contrast 
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arguments. Horgan concludes that in order to refute the outcome drawn from this thought 
experiment, one must either deny that such zombies are possible—a task which seems 
implausible, assuming one is willing to get on board with the plausibility arguments that zombie 
experiments in general need to get off the ground—or one must beg the question by assuming 
that cognitive phenomenology does not exist from the outset. The latter of these options, of 
course, is fallacious. 
 While not proposed specifically in the literature against Horgan’s partial zombies, the 
same metaphysical concerns against philosophical zombies more generally holds some weight 
here, as well. Although Horgan argues, and one might agree, that partial zombies are, indeed, 
robustly conceivable, this does not necessarily mean that they are metaphysically possible. While 
it seems reasonable to illustrate that such a thing is plausible (or implausible), and therefore open 
up the possibility that the plausible thing may exist and have implications for how we think about 
the question of cognitive phenomenology, “plausible” and “actual” are, metaphysically speaking, 
two distinct realities. However, Horgan’s goal is not to establish a metaphysical reality, but 
rather to give us another way to look at the idea of cognitive phenomenology with a more 
nuanced lens than the appeal to intuition that is required by contrast arguments. While one might 
argue that Horgan, as well, is relying on intuition to get his zombies off the ground, the intuition 
is less personally subjective and more philosophically robust than what is being appealed to by 
classic contrast arguments. In this case, his argument seems to be sound.  
Consciousness and Qualia 
 A final (and perhaps most effective) argument for the existence of such a unique 
phenomenology is derived from the existence of consciousness itself. Setting aside worries about 
the debate surrounding the existence of qualia, it has been argued by philosopher Michelle 




Montague that cognitive phenomenology is a necessary requirement for conscious experience.59 
Qualia, the “introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives,” 60  must be 
conscious—we cannot have a phenomenal experience without some kind of conscious awareness 
of it. As such, it seems necessary that for a thought (cognition) to have a phenomenal character, 
it must be conscious—and conscious in a way that it does not seem that sensory phenomena have 
to be in order to have phenomenal qualities.61 For example, even if a subject is focused solely on 
the computer screen in front of her, and therefore only truly conscious of what is happening in 
that space, there remains for the subject “something it is like” to be experiencing (though not 
consciously) the sound of other keyboards, the red of the book in her peripheral vision, or the 
blue of the water bottle to her right. This relative “unawareness” or “unconsciousness” of these 
peripheral experiences does not seem to diminish their phenomenal character in any way—
though, perhaps it may be argued that they would be “stronger” if one were to shift one’s 
attention to them. Perhaps the experience of the book or the water bottle would be richer if one 
was also experiencing the phenomenal character of shape, etc., in addition to the object’s color. 
But there is some sensory phenomenal character (however incomplete) in these peripheral 
experiences nevertheless. 
Thoughts, on the other hand, do not seem to have a phenomenal character if one is not 
consciously aware of or deploying the concept at a given time. This difference in conscious 
awareness, argues Montague, is why cognitions have to have something over and above sensory 
experiences—in other words, their own unique and irreducible phenomenology.62 Unlike sensory 
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experiences, there is a difference between having the belief that cats have four legs, and 
consciously deploying that belief into the thought “cats have four legs.” By deploying the 
concept of “legs on cats,” one experiences the qualia associated with that concept, but below the 
level of conscious awareness, although the belief remains intact and, arguably, existent, it does 
not in that moment have any phenomenal character associated with it. In short, then, the 
experience of the phenomenal content of a cognition is rooted in the deployment of that 
cognition as a concept usable for mental manipulation.63 Therefore, if cognitive phenomenology 
is a genuine occurrence, it must be fundamentally different from sensory experiences, and as 
such completely irreducible to such experiences. 
This type of argument from consciousness, though not infallible, is particularly resilient 
against accusations that cognitive phenomenology is merely sensory phenomenology being 
misinterpreted or misunderstood. It also retains the complexity and connectivity of cognitions by 
explaining how and why there can be a unique phenomenal experience of thoughts, while 
maintaining the reality that certain beliefs/ideas/desires can continue to exist or be a factor in 
sensory experiences while remaining below the level of conscious awareness. Taken in tandem 
with the illustrations of non-iconic thinking, contrast arguments, and Horgan’s partial zombies, it 
seems quite likely that, despite some continued disagreement, cognitions have a unique and 
irreducible phenomenology associated with them.   
Summary  
Overall, it seems clear that much of the current debate over a thesis of cognitive 
phenomenology comes down mostly to intuitional disagreement, as cognitive phenomenology is 
a difficult (if not impossible) experience to test, being in many ways as intangible and illusive as 
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consciousness itself—thus why much of the present focus has been on how it is supposed to 
work, rather than whether or not it exists as such. Even with intuitional disagreements, the 
overall thesis—in some form or another—is largely accepted. The main issue becomes, then, not 
its existence, but rather what that existence looks like, and what implications the thesis has for 
things like consciousness and ideas of intentional content, as well as how we are to go about 
distinguishing cognitions from perceptions. 64  Potential implications of the thesis are further 
complicated if one also accepts a theory of cognitive penetration, a relationship which will be 
explored next.  
Part II: Cognitive Phenomenology and Cognitive Penetration 
 Unsurprisingly, there are a number of similarities between the anomaly of cognitive 
phenomenology and that of cognitive penetration. Similarities that, if not considered, have the 
potential to cause philosophers to confuse one with the other, and/or cover ground within the 
philosophy of mind and cognitive psychology which has already been explored by those working 
primarily with the other thesis. By disregarding one or the other subsection of the literature, it 
seems we may be doing both a disservice, as it may be that it is possible to utilize the two 
phenomena in order to bolster each other, or, at the very least, further solidify the underlying 
assumptions which are necessary to get both theses off the ground. In the following section, 
some of the potential implications of this ignorance, as well as how these phenomena seem to be 
complementary will be explored.   
Cognitive Phenomenology as Penetration? 
There have been some attempts to make the thesis of cognitive phenomenology tenable 
by proposing versions of the thesis which are significantly “weaker” or less robust than the 
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definition currently being deployed (unique and irreducible to other phenomenal experiences). 
One such thinker is Joseph Levine, who in a 2011 paper explored several versions of a cognitive 
phenomenology thesis. Although he settled on what he called “cognitive phenomenology with 
opaque content” as being the most viable (albeit itself quite weak in comparison to some 
versions of the thesis), he also suggested that an even weaker thesis, what he termed "impure 
cognitive phenomenology" would also be theoretically viable. 65  This impure version of the 
cognitive phenomenology thesis is said to impress something more on sensory experiences, 
changing the character of the sensory phenomenal experience, as opposed to the cognition being 
a standalone phenomenal experience. In other words, a “cognitive phenomenological” 
experience exists only as a kind of enhancement to a given sensory experience.  
Montague, however, argues that Levine specifically seems to be confused about what 
cognitive phenomenology is (and cannot be), and that what such an "impure" thesis really 
amounts to is a glorified version of cognitive penetration—not a thesis of cognitive phenomenal 
experience at all.66 Montague suggests that he has weakened the thesis too far, thus letting it 
bleed into a thesis more like cognitive penetration, suggesting that if one is not careful, there is 
the potential for cognitive phenomenology to collapse into cognitive penetration. Although 
Levine ultimately backs off from the impure theses he proposes, settling for an overall stronger 
version of cognitive phenomenology, it is clear that without some cross discussion, there is the 
danger of retreading water within these debates, as the philosophical community may continue to 
miss the potential relationship (or lack thereof) between these two ideas. While the potential for 
making such a mistake as Levine does—where he collapses one thesis into the other—seems 
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relatively low (especially now that someone has done just that), this does illustrate that the 
potential for similar confusions to occur, and similarly suggests that there are as-yet untapped 
connections between and implications of these theories.   
Distinctions Between Cognition and Perception 
 Similar to the way in which cognitive penetration blurs the previously strong line 
between what is a cognition and what is a penetration, cognitive phenomenology also raises 
questions regarding the difference (or apparent lack thereof) between what has been considered 
as two separate and distinct categories. In particular, if cognitions have phenomenal character 
like cognitive phenomenology suggests, then in what ways—if any—are cognitions distinct from 
sensory perceptual experiences? The answer, it seems, is not many. If phenomenal character has 
previously been one of the things which anchors the line between higher-order “cognition” and 
lower-order “perception,” then adding such a character to the cognition removes one of the key 
distinguishing factors between them. Removing, as well, the insulation of these cognitions from 
outside influence as does cognitive penetration, and it seems this particular distinction has two 
major legs kicked out from under it.   
Defense via Sensory Phenomenality  
As we have seen, one of the most commons strategies to refute a thesis of cognitive 
phenomenology is to argue that such experiences merely “collapse into” sensory experiences; 
that when proponents of cognitive phenomenology are arguing for a unique phenomenological 
experience, what they are in reality accomplishing is merely an unnecessarily complex 
explanation of sensory experiences, wishfully interpreted as unique in some way. Similar 
arguments have been made against cases of cognitive penetration; opponents suggest that what 
cases are proposed as being penetrated experiences are merely (unnecessarily) complexly 




interpreted sensory experiences. While there are some distinctions to be made regarding why 
these critiques are launched against their respective targets, there is something to be said about 
the similarity that is being argued for—i.e. that experience is “just” sensory in nature.  
The question becomes, then, why opponents of these ideas are so wedded to the idea of 
sensory phenomena as being static in the way they have always been conceived to be. The 
answer to this inquiry is, I believe, that this commitment to sensory phenomena as being 
necessarily tied to the way(s) we have historically interpreted them—namely, as being basically 
the only experience(s) with discernable phenomenal character, and relatively uninfluenced by 
other operations of the mind—is that so much of our thinking surrounding consciousness and 
mental functioning has been tied to this understanding. Even Descartes started from sensory 
phenomena and worked his way up to higher-order cognitions—it is the simplest, most 
accessible piece of human functioning and consciousness. However, theses like cognitive 
phenomenology and evidence for occurrences such as cognitive penetration seem to fly in the 
face of the very grounding of these ideas of consciousness and the mind. If sensory phenomena 
are not what we have theorized, supposed, and known them to be for so long, we have, in 
essence, removed the grounding for many of the traditional and current working theories within 
the philosophy of mind.  
Consciousness and Mind Models 
In addition to potentially altering the way we view sensory inputs, cognitive 
phenomenology has implications for how we think about the mind and its theoretical structures. 
As noted above, the existence of a robust sense of cognitive phenomenology has direct 
implications for how we conceive of consciousness, specifically questions which revolve around 
the anomaly that consciousness seems to some to be. It has been suggested that if cognitive 




phenomenology exists, there are no more “easy problems” of consciousness, since this theory 
eliminates the non-phenomenal aspects of our experience, as laid out by Chalmers and others.67 
If events such as discriminating one object from another or the reporting of mental states become 
similarly phenomenal like “purely sensory” states such as hearing and seeing, then explaining 
these “higher-order” cognitive states does appear to become more difficult, indeed.68  
 One of the main reasons for denying a thesis of cognitive phenomenology is very similar 
to the reasons expressed in the denial of cognitive penetration—in short, that such a thesis overly 
complicates/alters current working theories of the mind and consciousness. Theories of 
encapsulation and other similar models imply that cognitions lack any communication with other 
processes of the mind. As discussed in the previous chapter, this lack of communication in 
theory keeps cognitions from influencing sensory experiences, but this theory also implies that 
sensory experiences do not impact cognition except in so far as a cognition may be the “output” 
of a sensory experience. Overall, these theories boil cognitions down to being akin to a 
somewhat inconsequential “middle step” between input and output. For example, an agent, 
James, sees a tree (sensory input), thinks “that tree looks shady” (interpretation of sensory data), 
and walks towards the tree (behavioral output). However, assuming that there is something it is 
like to have such an interpretation greatly complicates encapsulation-type theories, because it 
makes these middle steps so much more than “simple”—so much more than “just” a middle step 
in a behaviorist’s fantasy. The resulting complexity further suggests that we do not understand 
how the mind works, and thus we are further away from understanding consciousness than many 
would like to think we are—as mentioned above, cognitive phenomenology seems to eliminate 
                                                 
67 Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness,” (1995); Smithies, “The Significance of Cognitive 
Phenomenology,” (2013). 
68 Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness,” (1995). 




the “easy problems” of consciousness, and it appears to do so by, at its root, complicating what 
models of the mind are acceptable, in much the same way that cognitive penetration seems to.  
Part III: Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have attempted to illustrate that a unique, robust, and irreducible theory 
of cognitive phenomenology is plausible and that the evidence and arguments made in its favor 
are adequately strong to suppose that such a phenomenon does, indeed, exist as a feature of 
human consciousness. 69  Similarly, it has been illustrated that this phenomenon is also 
significantly different from the thesis of cognitive penetration (the existence of which was 
argued for in Chapter One)—and, more importantly, neither experience can be reduced to the 
other. Given the complexity required for both concepts, it seems clear that certain theories such 
as the "classical sandwich model" 70 and encapsulation theories of the mind are untenable. 
Although it has largely come down to the brave and the few who continue to hold encapsulation-
type theories of the mind,71  it seems that still we hold to many of the historical tenets of 
philosophy which seem to necessarily rest on such theories. How one might go about accounting 
for the implications of cognitive phenomenology, cognitive penetration, and the subsequent mind 
model(s) they imply, as well as how one might go about applying these implications to classical 
philosophical dichotomies (including the cognition/perception distinction already discussed) is 
what we will turn to next.       
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As we saw in the previous chapters, both cognitive penetration and cognitive 
phenomenology have faced backlash on the basis of maintaining our traditional views of the 
mind, consciousness, and cognitive thought processes. As such, it is clear that if one were to 
accept both of these controversial theses, one must also accept a more complex (less traditional) 
model of the mind. In accepting a more complex view of the mind, one must simultaneously 
reject certain historically held philosophical distinctions. One such distinction (touched upon in 
both of the previous chapters) is the line drawn between perception and cognition. A second 
distinction which will be detailed more thoroughly here is that of reason and emotion. While 
traditional models of the mind have strived to maintain this reason/emotion division—including 
our current primary example seen in Fodor's modularity model—it seems clear that, at its root, 
the continued backlash over both penetration and cognitive phenomenology is in some ways a 
result of the struggle to maintain this traditional divide. Yet, if the mind does not work in the way 
laid out by Fodor and his contemporaries, then there is the potential that affective states (being 
both cognitive and not so sharply distinct from reason) give us meaningful and useful 
information about the world—an idea that runs contrary to many traditional views within 
philosophy in general, and epistemic theory more specifically. As such, the implication(s) of the 
reason/emotion division are called into question, and while this does not solve any of the 
potential issues raised by cognitive penetration (namely an increased inability to trust our 
sensory perceptions), it does suggest that we need to reject both models of the mind that support 
the reason/emotion distinction, as well as the distinction itself (at least on a non-conceptual level) 
in favor of a more complex view which makes room for the role of emotion in reasoning.  




In light of this, the goal of the present work is first to discuss in some depth a bit of the 
precedent to maintain the philosophical distinctions complex theories of the mind require us to 
reject. Second, to lay out what a more complex version of the mind might look like once we have 
rejected modularity-type views. Finally, the potential of applying cognitive phenomenological 
principles to this New World where the reason/emotion distinction is moot will be illustrated. 
While such an allowance for the role of affect in reasoning does not give us any more confidence 
in our sensory perceptions (especially in light of phenomena like cognitive penetration), it does 
seem that such decrease in confidence is relatively inconsequential when compared to the bigger 
picture.  
Part I: Historical Considerations 
 It is no secret in the field of philosophy that our theories have been largely biased along a 
variety of strictly bifurcated positions. For centuries we have attempted to maintain a sharp 
divide between reason and emotion which has influenced not only areas such as theories of 
epistemology, but also who was and was not allowed to practice philosophy (being a “purely 
rational” discipline, and women, of course, being less-than rational 72 ), as well as what 
philosophical theories were acceptable. While this divide has been greatly criticized in recent 
years, especially by feminist thinkers such as philosopher Margaret Little,73 it is evident by the 
fact that some continue to cling to traditional views of how the mind operates (as well as theories 
of epistemology which state that the only role for emotions is as a wholly irrational way to 
“muddy” reason) that there are still those in the field who continue to hold onto this distinction 
despite its gasping for a few last dying breaths. While such a distinction may continue to make 
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sense on a purely conceptual level, it seems clear that these concepts are more interconnected at 
their basis than previously supposed. As delineated in the previous chapters, the evidence to 
suggest that these traditional mind models are no longer viable is almost overwhelming—an idea 
which is even clearer if we accept the idea of cognitive phenomenology, which is built on a 
similar theory of how the mind works as is required for cognitive penetration, as detailed in 
Chapter Two.  
 The theory, then, is that the ideas of cognitive penetration and cognitive phenomenology, 
and their shared basis and connections support a more complicated theory of the mind, which in 
turn offers support for the idea that there is not this sharp distinction between reason and emotion 
in the same way that these models of the mind do away with the sharp distinction between 
perception and cognition. As such, theories of epistemology can (and, indeed, ought to) include 
ideas about how emotion potentially plays into knowledge acquisition—with both negative and 
positive impacts—as it seems almost laughable in light of these emerging ideas of the mind and 
the evidence for these new models to suggest that reason and emotion are sharply distinct. 
Specifically, Michelle Montague’s theory of evaluative phenomenology will be utilized as one 
possible way to begin modifying how we think about epistemic theory based on this more 
complex mind view, followed by a discussion of how this view impacts the potential issues 
involved in cognitive penetration that modularity theorists point to as a reason to reject the 
evidence for such experiences.  
Part II: Supporting a New Theory 
Penetrability, Cognitive Phenomenology, and Models of the Mind 
 As argued in the previous chapters, modularity and similar theories are unviable ideas of 
how the human mind works. This is clear both from the empirical evidence for cognitive 




penetration, as well as the philosophical arguments for cognitive phenomenology. Yet there are 
those who continue to hold to this model. As noted briefly above, this seems largely due to an 
unwillingness to part with traditional views and work with a model which is more complex—in 
part, perhaps, because it would require giving up the reason/emotion distinction which is in many 
ways the very basis for much of modern philosophical thought. Specifically, modularity and 
similar sandwich-type models retain the idea that different processes—e.g. perceptual intake and 
cognitive interpretation—take place completely separate from one another, and therefore have no 
real influence over each other. Every thought, every input, every output is processed in isolation 
and then, only once fully refined, is passed on to the next module. This helps retain the idea that 
emotions (specifically as cognitions) do not—in fact, cannot—interfere with other processes 
(such as they might given penetrability), and offers support for the idea that, even though the 
emotional module can “overwhelm” a person’s thought processes, it is possible to separate these 
out, and in some sense “train” one’s higher-order modules to achieve full rationality and not let 
one’s emotion module overtake one’s reasoning module(s).  
 It seems, however, given the empirical evidence for cognitive penetration, and the 
philosophical evidence for cognitive phenomenology that this modularity theory is implausible—
meaning that the mind is not so cleanly divided as Fodor and his contemporaries supposed. As 
such, it appears that there are not only feed-forward processes (e.g. perception to cognition to 
output) but also feed-backward processes (e.g. cognition to perception to cognition to output), 
making a working model of the mind so complex so as to be almost incomprehensible with just a 
cursory glance.74 This is a far cry from the clean, neatly delineated, and one-way connected 
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modules of Fodor’s idealistic modular view. In a system which crisscrosses and loops back in on 
itself, it is much harder to create the kind of distinctions which philosophers are so keen to make. 
Not only is it no longer possible for reason and emotion to be so clear cut, but (as mentioned 
earlier in the present work) distinctions like those between perception and cognition become 
similarly confused. Despite these consequences, however, a much more complex model seems to 
be required in order to accurately begin to conceive of human experience and consciousness. 
 In short, then, unless one rejects both cognitive penetration and cognitive phenomenology 
for some reason (beyond the idea that it will overly complicate current ideas about 
consciousness), it seems clear that one must accept them both as plausible, as either one implies 
the need for a more complex model of the mind. Once a more complex model has been 
established, the other thesis becomes equally as plausible as the first. In this way, these theories 
are mutually supportive, as they rest on a similar base—a complex, non-modular, 
feedforward/feedback view of the mind. Of course, one may still attempt to attack both theses at 
the point of this complex mind model thesis, but in order to do this, one must successfully rebut 
two sets of evidence—namely, the empirical evidence for penetrability, and the philosophical 
evidence for cognitive phenomenology. 
Affect and Epistemology 
 Without a sharp distinction between reason and emotion, there is no longer a place to rest 
the argument that knowledge can only come from pure reason. Given a more complex model of 
how the mind operates such as that suggested above, it is clear that a variety of factors must play 
                                                                                                                                                             
to the point of not being capable of being understood by any theoretical model. Rather, the pieces of importance for 
the present project is an understanding of the complexity of the mind (which goes far beyond modularity’s 
explanatory power), and that complexity’s implication that the brain can in no way be insulated from other areas of 
the brain in the way necessary for modularity to work. The details beyond these stipulations remain a project for 
another thesis entirely. 




into knowledge acquisition because other processes cannot be filtered out—including emotion. If 
we are to suppose that we have any ability to obtain legitimate knowledge of our outside world at 
all,75 we must make space for emotion to play a role in how that acquisition is achieved, since it 
is impossible to separate its strands from those of our rational or perceptual capacities. The 
question, then, is not whether emotion plays a role in knowledge acquisition, but what kind of 
role it plays. Given this entwinement of reason and emotion, it is clear that affect cannot play a 
solely knowledge-diminishing kind of role (i.e. "clouding" an agent's ability to obtain objective 
information about the world) as has been historically suggested. Because affective states seem to 
be so very intertwined with those of our reason, to exclude affect as a part of our cognitive 
epistemic processing is to, in some respects, exclude other cognitive processes, including reason. 
Indeed, in addition to its interdependence with reason and other "rational" cognitive 
processes, emotional processes have been argued by both proponents of cognitive penetration as 
well as certain thinkers in favor of cognitive phenomenology to be higher-order cognitions. Even 
if modularity were plausible, then, it seems unreasonable to exclude such higher-order cognitive 
states from consideration in epistemic theory, as it seems it can be argued that affective 
"modules" would be on a similar hierarchical level as rational cognitive modules. As such, it 
seems that even modularity theorists must work harder to establish the disconnect of emotion 
from epistemic consideration, by maintaining that emotions are relevantly non-cognitive, in 
addition to providing evidence in the face of empirical work showing modularity to be 
implausible, as well as reason and emotion to be more interconnected than previously 
supposed.76 
                                                 
75 Or of our inner world, though that, too, is a question for a different discussion. 
76 Justin Storbeck and Gerald L. Clore, “On the Interdependence of Cognition and Emotion,” (2007).”  




This mental complexity leaves open several options for the role of affect, and, given the 
intertwined nature of experience, cognition, and emotion, it seems clear that thinkers like 
Montague and Little are correct in arguing that the most plausible and intriguing option for the 
role of affect in knowledge acquisition is as a valuable source of information—one that ought to 
be considered and analyzed, rather than immediately dismissed. Although these thinkers 
primarily suggest that the connection between emotion and knowledge is moral or ethical in 
nature, it seems in many ways that in addition to giving us valuable information about the moral 
qualities of a given situation, they are also providing us with other important aspects of the 
external world, depending on context. In short, emotional states are communicating to us 
important and necessary information about the world around us—without such information, our 
understanding of external situations would be greatly diminished, and our knowledge of those 
situations incomplete, both in moral situations and in more value-neutral, social, and non-social 
situations. As such, affect seems to play a (debatably) non-subjective, bolstering role in the 
acquisition of knowledge and is just as important as sensory perception or rational consideration 
for gaining a complete picture of our external world.  
Evaluative Phenomenology 
Evaluative phenomenology is the unique phenomenological character of affective states 
proposed by Montague, who suggests that affective states are similar to sensory perceptions in 
nature, giving them unique qualia. For example, when Joan sees a blue coffee cup, she 
experiences a phenomenal character as of blue; but the "blue" is contained not in Joan but is 
rather somehow attached to or possessed by the coffee cup, which merely elicits the phenomenal 
state it does in Joan. Similarly, when Joan is at a child's birthday party, in addition to perceiving 
the sensory phenomena of the situation—the red of the puppet-character themed cake, the 




roundness of the balloons, the screams of the children playing—she also perceives an evaluative 
phenomenal experience as of happiness. It is argued, then, that in the same way that the coffee 
mug somehow embodies or has attached to it the quale of "blue," so the birthday party has the 
quality of "joy" or "happiness." The happiness is not a thing which is contained in Joan but is 
rather something which is attached to or possessed by the situation and merely elicits the 
phenomenal state it does in Joan in a way which is distinct from and irreducible to either sensory 
or cognitive phenomenological states which the situation also elicits. Because the phenomena 
being experienced by Joan are contained in the circumstances and not in herself, those 
phenomena are carrying important, external information about a situation in the same way that 
sensory phenomena carry external information about situations. In this way, then, intentionally 
directed emotional states are, under Montague’s view, as epistemically valuable as are sensory 
states and therefore ought to be considered as a significant part of/source for knowledge 
acquisition. 
One must keep in mind, however, that if these evaluative processes are on par with 
sensory processes, then they are similarly in danger of being cognitively penetrable in the way 
that perceptual sensory processes can be. In her discussion of evaluative phenomenology, 
Montague mentions briefly those sorts of emotional states—such as depression or anxiety—
which have an overarching way of seeming to be present in all situations (regardless of the 
evaluative character contained within those situation), but suggests that it may be the case that 
these sort of encompassing emotional states (or moods) are not intentionally directed as the 
emotions she wishes to highlight are, and therefore their phenomenal character(s) (and their 
potential role in knowledge and understanding) may be different from those of intentionally 




directed emotional states.77 It does seem, however, that these sorts of free floating emotional 
states can be the kind which are capable of penetrating our perceptual experiences—including 
those of intentionally directed emotional states, providing further support both for cognitive 
penetration and the above argument regarding the complexity of the mind, since this sort of 
penetration (e.g. as of depression) is suggestive of a cognition penetrating a cognition (e.g. the 
phenomenal experience as of happiness at a birthday party being perceived phenomenally as 
sadness, despite the “rational” cognitive knowledge that its reality is otherwise). It seems clear, 
as well, that something like “mind over matter” types of emotional suppression may similarly be 
a case of a cognition penetrating a cognition, by an agent attempting to utilize their “reason” to 
suppress their emotional experience of the world. 
Of course, although such cases provide support for the basis of cognitive phenomenology 
(a complex model of the mind), its evidence for penetration suggests that emotional states, while 
potentially epistemically advantageous in the way that sensory states may be, are subject to many 
(if not all) of the epistemic pitfalls associated with sensory states. Not only might evaluative 
states be subject to cognitive penetration (decreasing their epistemic weight, often without an 
agent realizing it is happening), but it may be the case that other varieties of “mistakes” which 
impact sensory perceptions are similarly likely to be made. In this way, then, while evaluative 
phenomenology adds another potential layer to how we gain and retain epistemological evidence 
of our external world, it also presents another area where we can be mistaken about our own 
perceptions of that world. As such, while it does seem to have the potential to be a valuable 
epistemic resource, it also seems to open just one more can of worms. 
 Despite its potential pitfalls, however, assuming Montague is correct, it seems we ought 
                                                 
77 Montague, The Given, (2016), pgs. 216-235. 




to be treating emotional states in the same way we do perceptual ones—as valuable, yet 
potentially fallible on similar grounds to sensory perceptions. In short, it is clear that the 
reason/emotion distinction ought to be finally laid to rest. This gives us reason to teach the 
potential epistemic value of emotional states and perceptions, as well as their potential 
downfalls, in the hope that reintegrating the steep division maintained between reason and 
emotion will lead to better understanding, more realistic and complex theories, and a better 
philosophical landscape. 
Penetrability and Epistemology 
 As emphasized previously, ideas of cognitive penetrability and cognitive phenomenology 
are mutually supportive theses, notably because they both rest on a more complex, two-way 
communication view of the human mind. If the division between reason and emotion can be 
successfully removed on the basis of both evaluative phenomenology specifically, and a more 
complex model of the mind more broadly, it seems that the idea of cognitive penetrability 
becomes not only less surprising, but expected—and if it is expected, it can be accounted for 
more easily. Perhaps this ease of accounting for cognitive penetrability does not translate to 
detection for individual agents, but it ought to change the way we view perception in the study of 
human behavior and psychology, phenomenology, and philosophy more broadly.  
  In addition to providing evidence for the interdependence of reason and emotion, 
cognitive penetration and cognitive phenomenology also suggest trouble for the non-conceptual 
distinction held between cognition and perception, a point which is incredibly clear when 
considering the theory of evaluative phenomenology specifically, as well as the discussion in 
Chapter Two regarding the relative status of affective states as either cognitive, perceptual, or 
both. By suggesting a more intertwined theory for these traditional distinctions and opening a 




feedforward/feedback view of the mind, it seems that in some respects, penetrability is less 
problematic than it initially appears, if only because the human mind is such that penetrability is 
unavoidable. The best solution, then, is to accept that penetrability is an existent and complex 
phenomenon, which has an intricate directionality,78 and we therefore must acknowledge this 
existence so as to make attempts to account for its intricacies and their implications wherever 
possible. While most agents will likely remain relatively unaware of the phenomenon, steps can 
be taken to put measures in place to mitigate the potential consequences of penetrability—such 
as has already been done in the sciences79 and is being done to reduce the impact of cognitive 
bias in certain business and industrial settings80—and these systems and rules can be continually 
updated and modified as we continue to learn more about penetrability and the workings of the 
human mind. 
Part III: Conclusion 
In conclusion, it is clear when carefully examining the evidence for cognitive 
penetrability and cognitive phenomenology respectively that the mind is much more complex 
than a Fodorian modularity view can properly account for, and therefore modularity (as 
traditionally construed) ought to be rejected in favor of a model of the mind that can properly 
accommodate both penetrability and cognitive phenomenology. Although Fodor’s initial concern 
regarding penetrability—namely, that such a phenomenon would do away with the theory 
neutrality of scientific observation—is only made more concrete by accepting a theory of 
penetrability and rejecting his modular solution, by accepting that our observations are not going 
                                                 
78 I.e. cognitions can penetrate cognitions, as well as perceptions, because of this now defunct distinction between 
non-conceptual understandings of cognition and perception, as well as other mind states. 
79 E.g. through the continued use of peer review, replicability, and continuing the refinement of the scientific 
method, particularly for “young” fields, such as psychology.  
80 E.g. brainstorming all the things that could go wrong with a plan before its implementation.  




to be perfectly theory neutral (regardless of how the mind operates) will only lead to better 
theories and innovations to check for bias. The need for a modified, non-modular model of the 
mind becomes even clearer when considering the evidence for cognitive phenomenology, which 
must rest on a similarly complex, feed-forward/feedback view of the mind in order to really get 
off the ground. Given these theories together, as well as the mind complexity on which they rest, 
it becomes clear that the distinction between cognition and perception is not so clear as has 
previously been suggested, meaning that we perhaps know less about these phenomena than we 
previously supposed. Cognitive phenomenology in particular has implications for other such 
traditional dichotomies, including the distinction seen between reason and emotion, as well as 
consciousness more generally. As such, it has been proposed that emotion plays a valuable role 
in gathering information about our external world, therefore playing a part in knowledge 
acquisition. While this “new” role for emotion in epistemology does not solve the potential 
epistemic issues seen by Fodor and his contemporaries as being a reason to hold on to modularity 
and reject cognitive penetrability, it does suggest that these issues are just the beginning of the 
problems raised by penetrability and cognitive phenomenology. However, despite the potential 
epistemic and scientific issues raised by these two theories, and the necessary rejection of 
modularity, it is clear that in light of the available evidence (from both psychology and 
philosophy) that a more complex model of the mind is a more accurate model of the mind. 
Although working with a more complex model of the mind seems to cause a number of 
philosophical and psychological issues, it is better to deal with these issues within the framework 
of this more complex view, rather than by attempting to simplify the mind in order to negate the 
problems raised by penetrability and cognitive phenomenology just to salvage traditional views 
of reason/emotion, cognition/perception, and consciousness.    
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